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THE BILL OF RIGHTS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND
THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Richard L. Aynes*
INTRODUCTION
The publication of The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction' by one of
the nation's most prominent scholars from one of the nation's most prominent law
schools was bound to be a major event in academia. The Bill of Rights has been
selected as an offering for the History Book of the Month Club, favorably profiled
in a two-page interview in the American Bar Association Journal,2 and was the
subject of a two-page excerpt in the American Lawyer.3 It also has been favorably
reviewed on electronic discussion lists4 and in traditional law journals.5
While the enduring quality of such work is to be judged not by months but by
decades,6 this Article considers why the work of Professor Amar has been so well
* Dean, Professor of Law, and Constitutional Law Center Research Fellow, The
University of Akron School of Law. I want to express my appreciation to Rosemary
Cannon, Michael Kent Curtis and Wilson R. Huhn for critiquing a prior draft of this
Article.
AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
2 Re-examining the Bill of Rights, 85 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at 86, 86-87.
3 Akhil Reed Amar, Hero Worship and the Bill of Rights, AM. LAW., Dec. 1998, at 66
[hereinafter Amar, Hero Worship].
" See, e.g., John M. Scheb, II, 9 Law & Politics Book Rev. I (visited Jan. 1998)
<http://www.unt.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/Amar98.html> (review of THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION).
' See e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans:
Holism, Synthesis, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273 (1999); Robert J.
Cottrol, Structure, Participation, Citizenship and Right: Lessons from Akhil Amar's
Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 87 GEO. L.J. 2307 (1999); Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Utility andSignificance of Professor Amar's Holistic Reasoning, 87 GEO. L.J. 2327 (1999);
Edward A. Hartnett, The Akhil Reed Amar Bill of Rights, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 373
(1999); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Back to the Future? How the Bill of Rights Might Be About
Structure After All, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 977 (1999); Jack N. Rakove, Two Foxes in the
Forest of History, I 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191, 191-203 (1999); Symposium,
Commentaries on Akhil Reed Amar's The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction, 33
U. RICH. L. REV. 289 (1999).
6 One is reminded of WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, JR., 3 POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1980), whose publication
was a "major event in constitutional scholarship." PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 17 (1982). Though most of the initial reviews were quite
favorable, ultimately the work was the subject of great controversy. See Richard L. Aynes,
Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1197, 1244-50 (1995) [hereinafter Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter].
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received thus far. In examining this question, this Article will focus upon examples
from the second portion of Professor Amar's work and his doctrine of refined
incorporation." In doing so, this Article suggests that there are "seven deadly sins"'
in the field of legal history:
(1) Disrespect for historical figures and legal historians;
(2) Abandonment oftraditionally tested methods of interpretation without
a sufficient basis for their replacement;
(3) Failure to examine matters in context;
(4) Anachronistic analysis;
(5) Substitution of quotations for analysis;
(6) Inconsistency; and
(7) The false impasse.9
Of course, each of these may be stated more positively, as "seven heavenly virtues":1o
(1) Take people seriously;
(2) Work with time-proven methods and build a firm foundation for
innovations;
(3) In judging the text, context is important;
(4) Guard against anachronisms;
(5) Only quote what you know to be the truth or likely to be the truth
(avoid the "if two people said it, it must be true" approach);
(6) Strive for scholarly consistency; and
(7) Recognize that not every disagreement results in an impasse.
7 I have previously expressed my own reservations about the use of the term
"incorporation" with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Richard L. Aynes, Refined
Incorporation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 289 (1999) [hereinafter
Aynes, Refined Incorporation].
' The original seven deadly sins were said to be pride, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness,
gluttony, and lust. The theme has been used many times before. See, e.g., Seven Deadly
Sins (visited Jan. 1998) <http://www.deadlysins.com/isle.html> (suggesting that each of the
seven characters in the 1960s TV program Gilligan's Island represented one of the seven
deadly sins).
" For a useful view of common errors in the writing of history, see generally DAVID H.
FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES, TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970).
1o The original seven heavenly virtues are faith, hope, charity, fortitude, justice,
temperance, and prudence. See Seven Deadly Sins-Seven Heavenly Virtues (visited Mar.
29, 1999) <http://www.deadlysins.com/heavenlyvirtues.html>.
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This Article will provide examples of the "sins" in the history of the debate over
the meaning and effect of the Fourteenth Amendment and then test Professor Amar's
work against the same standard.
I. TAKING PEOPLE SERIOUSLY
Scholars stand upon one another's shoulders. One cannot conduct original
research upon every aspect of one's work. All academics rely upon the work and
effort of others. We build not only upon the "facts" they collect, but also upon the
insights they contribute. We all make judgments upon matters that demand our own
original research as well as matters in which we rely upon the work of others.
Legal research often requires scholars to analyze the reasoning and arguments of
a past generation of actors. We sometimes know (or think we know) a historical
celebrity when we encounter the words of people like Abraham Lincoln, Frederick
Douglass, or Susan B. Anthony. When we come upon a puzzling speech or letter
from someone whom we know well, we judge the content in the context of other
knowledge we have about that person." A lawyer-like distinction from Lincoln
would not take us by surprise. If it made sense to our legal minds, we would accept
it as unexceptional for Lincoln. An apparent un-lawyer-like analysis from Lincoln
would give us pause. Yet, we would work hard to resolve any dissonance by
determining whether Lincoln was a good lawyer, whether he was familiar with this
area of the law, whether logic led Lincoln to make such a statement, and so on.
Yet, we must determine what is our obligation when we encounter someone
whose name is not likely to be well-known to a whole generation of scholars. What
if we are reading the letters or speeches of Kate Chase,'2 George Washington
" Part III amplifies the importance of context in interpreting a text. See infra notes 82-
89 and accompanying text.
" Catherine Chase was the eldest surviving daughter of Salmon P. Chase, who was the
Governor of Ohio, a U.S. Senator, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court. Kate Chase was said to be one of the most beautiful women and
the most intelligent of her generation. She functioned as her father's press secretary and
was his campaign manager at the 1868 Democratic Convention. See generally ALICE HUNT
SOKOLOFF, KATE CHASE FOR THE DEFENSE (1971) (biography of Kate Chase); Richard L.
Aynes, Bradwell v. Illinois: Chief Justice Chase's Dissent and the "Sphere of Women's
Work," 59 La. L. REV. 521 (1999) (analysis of Kate Chase's influence upon her father's
views of womens' rights).
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Paschal, 3 or Albert Gallatin Riddle? 4 If their words resonate well with us, if their
ideas fit our own view of the world, if we can "make sense" of their views, then we
accept them as our intellectual colleagues. However, ifwe have not encountered such
individuals before and if their arguments do not immediately make sense to us, then
it is an all too human trait to engage in the first deadly sin of scholarship: to assume
that the problem is with the historic actor and not with ourselves.
This is a phenomenon that all humans experience. We "tend to see and hear only
those messages that are congruent with our interests and attitudes."' 5
We avoid exposing ourselves to information with which we disagree-a
process called selective exposure. If exposed to such information, we will
either reinterpret it so that it fits nicely with our interests and attitudes-a
process called selectiveperceptions-or we will forget it, a process called
selective retention.16
In the study of constitutional history, the incongruence of a historic actor's words
with our own view of the world naturally causes us to suspect the person is illogical,
lacks ability, or is somehow a person on the fringe of intellectual society or cultural
history. All too often, we not only disagree with such people, we also treat them with
disdain. If they do not make sense to us, they must not be people worthy of respect.
Indeed, in discussing the Barron Contrarians, Professor Amar notes, "[I]t is tempting
to dismiss all of these folks as dolts ....
When we encounter the speech of someone with whom we are unfamiliar, we
have lost our context. We are like travelers in unfamiliar territory without a map.
Thus, this Article suggests that this situation is one to which scholars should be alert:
the combination of the seemingly illogical speech with the unknown person. This
situation should also activate our "warning lights" and cause us to slow down. It
should encourage us to find out who this person was and how he or she was thought
"3 George Washington Paschal was a Supreme Court Justice in Arkansas, a unionist
leader in Texas during the Civil War, a reporter for the Texas Supreme Court, counsel for
Texas in White v. Texas, a leading treatise writer in the 1860s and 1870s, and one of the
early faculty members of the Georgetown Law School. See generally Richard L. Aynes,
George Washington Paschal, in 17 AM. NAT'L BIOGRAPHY, 107-08 (John A. Garraty &
Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999).
" Albert Gallatin Riddle was an Ohio anti-slavery Whig legislator who helped repeal
Ohio's black laws, helped articulate anti-slavery legal theory, and served as a one-term
congressman and U.S. Counsel at Matanzas, Cuba. Riddle became a prominent
Washington, D.C. lawyer and served on the faculty of Howard Law School. See generally
ALBERT G. RIDDLE, RECOLLECTIONS OF WAR TIMES (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1895).
's B. EUGENE GRIESSMAN, THE ACHIEVEMENT FACTORS, CANDID INTERVIEWS WITH
SOME OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL PEOPLE OF OUR TIME 191 (1993).
16 Id.
'" AMAR, supra note 1, at 147. He continues, "but we must resist." Id.
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of by his or her contemporaries. We should work hard to understand and to check
ourselves. We should ask whether the problem of finding a logical point of view lies
with the writer (or speaker) or with the reader.
This Article does not mean to suggest that the historic figure is always a
thoughtful and reasonable person. It counsels, however, that a cautious scholar must
look carefully at the person. The more that person seems to be a well-regarded,
soundly analytical person, the harder the scholar should work to try to understand the
historical figure's point of view. Again, understanding does not mean agreeing. It
does mean avoiding dismissive, disrespectful conclusions.
An example of the confluence of an unknown historical actor with a seemingly
unintelligible viewpoint is found in the work of one of our most respected
constitutional law scholars, Charles Fairman."8 June 23, 1947, was the date of the
Court's opinion in Adamson v. California.9 In Adamson, a five-member majority
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the enforcement of the Bill
of Rights against the states.2" Justice Black, in a dissenting opinion joined by-the
other three members of the minority, concluded that the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment did result in the enforcement of the first eight amendments against the
states.
21
Though Stanford did not yet have a law review, preparations were underway for
such ajournal and Professor Charles Fairman was one of the moving forces behind
it.22 Fairman began research the same year on his seminal article that ultimately
supported Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion inAdamson. 3 It was a busy time
in Fairman's life. By 1948, his new casebook, American Constitutional Law
Decisions, had been published.24 In December of that same year, Fairman's "Round
Table on Judicial Biography" was held at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association.25
IS Charles Fairman was a protdgd of Felix Frankfurter and taught at Stanford,
Washington (St. Louis), and Harvard. Fairman's 1949 Stanford article on the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights by the Fourteenth Amendment has been judged as one of the most cited
articles in the last 50 years. His Holmes' Devise--while criticized by some-has
nevertheless been judged as one of the "classics" in Reconstruction-era legal history. See
Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, in 7 AM. NAT'L. BIOGRAPHY (John A. Garraty &
Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999) [hereinafter Aynes, Charles Fairman]; see also Aynes,
Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6.
19 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
20 See id at5l.
2 See id, at 71-72.
22 See Aynes, Charles Fairman, supra note 18, at 1229.
23 See Charles Fairman, Does the 'Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) [hereinafter Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment]; see also
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
24 See Aynes, Charles Fairman, supra note 18, at 689.
2 See Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1224, 1228.
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Nevertheless, by sometime after September 1949, Fairman had published his
pathbreaking study.26 This account brought him face-to-face, at least intellectually,
with the author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Ohio Congressman John
A. Bingham." Though Fairman was an accomplished scholar,2" he had been
educated in the traditions of the Dunning School of Reconstruction29 and did not seem
to have kept pace with revisionist historians.30
This also appears to be the first time Fairman encountered Bingham in print.
Fairman's lack of familiarity with Bingham is suggested by the fact that Fairman
gave biographical information about several other individuals who participated in the
debate over the Fourteenth Amendment and even identified some as lawyers, 3' yet he
provided absolutely no biographical data concerning Bingham, not even the simple
fact that Bingham was also a lawyer.32
Looking at Bingham's first and shortest speech on an early version of the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment, 33 Fairman concluded that when Bingham referred
to the "immortal bill of rights,"' Bingham was referring not to the first eight
26 See id. at 1230 n.205. Prior to Fairman's work, there was virtual unanimity on the
idea that the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was inconsistent with the
legislative intent of the framers of the amendment. Some people praised this inconsistency
as having saved the nation from a great mistake and others condemned it as a breach of
faith, but all agreed upon the inconsistency. See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law
of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases,
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 681-86 (1994). Fairman's great contribution was to sketch a
theory under which the New Deal Court's approach in Adamson was thought to be
congruent with the legislative intent.
2 See Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1232.
28 See id, at 1205-08.
29 See id. at 1204. William A. Dunning and his students embraced the "mythic white
view of the horrors of Reconstruction." John Herbert Roper, John Hope Franklin, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOUTHERN CULTURE 208 (Charles Reagan Wilson & William Ferris
eds., 1989). Pamela Brandwein has suggested that Fairman's adherence to the Dunning
School of history "helped channel his perception away from materials that suggested the
existence of an antebellum constitutional dispute over the structure of federalism." Pamela
Brandwein, Dueling Histories: Charles Fairman and William Crosskey Reconstruct
"Original Understanding", 30 L. & SOC'Y REV. 289, 309. (1996). She also notes that
"Fairman was locked into his view of Barron as the only authoritative source of the
meaning of the antebellum Constitution ..... Id at 305.
30 See Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1269 n.489 (collecting and
summarizing positive and negative reviews).
31 See id. at 1231-32.
32 See id. at 1232.
" See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
34 Id.
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amendments to the U.S. Constitution, but rather to a combination of Article IV
Section 2 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.3"
Fairman's idiosyncratic reading of Bingham's speech36 led Fairman to conclude
that Bingham's views were marginal and idiosyncratic. By 1971, Fairman would
conclude that Bingham was "confused" ' 7 and held "peculiar conceptions."" Fairman
suggested that Bingham was "not a man of exact knowledge or clear conceptions or
accurate language,"39 but rather was "distinguished for elocution but not for hard
thinking." '
Evidence from Bingham's other speeches, the court cases cited in those speeches,
an understanding of the theories that underlie Bingham's constitutional views, and the
views of his contemporaries suggest that it was Fairman, not Bingham, who was
confused.4 Bingham's Bill of Rights, like Fairman's, consisted of the first eight
amendments to the U.S. Constitution.42 Yet, the important point here is not the
correctness or incorrectness of Fairman's analysis, but his lack of caution in reaching
that analysis. If the views Fairman thought he had found had been attributed to
someone with whom he was familiar and respected-such as President
Lincoln-Fairman undoubtedly would have worked harder to discover a cogent
meaning.
What could Fairman have learned about Bingham that would have informed his
reading of Bingham's Fourteenth Amendment speeches? Even in 1949, a cursory
search of biographic information about Bingham would have thrown light upon the
" See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 25-26.
36 Fairman's interpretation depended entirely upon the accuracy of the Globe's reporter
indicating that Bingham said "this immortal bill of rights" as opposed to "the immortal bill
of rights." See id
17 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888, PART I, 1288 [hereinafter 6 FAIRMAN,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT] (1971).
38 Id at 461.
'9 Id at 462.
40 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888, Part II, at 133 (1971) [hereinafter 7
FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT]. On the last point, Fairman quoted two
people friendly to Bingham who praised his speeches and two of Bingham's political
enemies whom Fairman claimed criticized Bingham's logic. See Richard L. Aynes, On
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 66, n.54
(1993) [hereinafter Aynes, Misreading Bingham].
"' See generally, AMAR, supra note 1, at 181-214 (giving a coherent account of
Bingham's views); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE] (same); Aynes, Misreading Bingham, supra note 40 (explaining how Fairman
was confused in his reading of Bingham's speeches, which can be read to articulate a
consistent, coherent, and traditional view of the Bill of Rights).
42 See Aynes, Misreading Bingham, supra note 40, at 66-74.
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man that Fairman termed a "key" figure in the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment.43 A barebones account of Bingham's career would show that he was an
experienced lawyer and raise the possibility that he was also a quality lawyer, thought
to be good at "hard thinking." A search would have included the following
information: lawyer; Tuscarawas County, Ohio Prosecutor for four years; Member
of Congress for nine years prior to the proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment;
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee for at least two sessions of Congress; Chairman
of the Managers in the successful impeachment of Judge West Humphreys for
treason;'" Special Judge Advocate General appointed by President Lincoln to court-
martial the Surgeon General of the United States; Solicitor of the United States Court
of Claims appointed by President Lincoln; Special Judge Advocate General in the
prosecution of those charged with President Lincoln's assassination; and Chairman
of the Managers in President Andrew Johnson's impeachment trial. 4,
These facts, in and of themselves, might have given Professor Fairman pause to
consider how a man, chosen by his contemporaries to hold these law-related positions,
could seemingly be so confused. Asking that question should drive a careful scholar
to dig deeply into Bingham's thinking.
46 Fairman failed to do this. 47
41 See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 25.
See generally Richard L. Aynes, The Impeachment and Removal of Tennessee Judge
West Humphreys: John Bingham's Prologue to the Johnson Impeachment Trial, 2 J. S.
LEGAL HIST. 71 (1993) [hereinafter Aynes, Impeachment and Removal] (giving an account
of Bingham's role in the Humphreys impeachment trial).
4' All of this information was readily available in public sources easily accessible to
Fairman in 1949. See, e.g., 2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 277-78 (Allen
Johnson ed., 1929); BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF
FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 183-84 (1914); CARRINGTON T. MARSHALL, 2 A HISTORY
OF THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF OHIO 860 (1934); 9 THE NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 375-76 (1899). These same sources would have told Fairman
several things about Bingham. First, he was an active campaigner for the Whig Party
beginning in 1840. Second, he called national attention to himself when he attempted to
have the Whig Party adopt an antislavery resolution as its platform in its 1848 Convention.
Third, Bingham was one of the early leaders of the Republican Party in Ohio. Finally,
having served in Congress as a Republican from 1854-1862 and 1865-1872, Bingham was
intimately involved in most of the important national developments leading to the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
46 One scholar who, to his credit, ferreted out this type of biographic data and asked
these questions was Paul Dimond. See Paul Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial
Review of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul
Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462, 481-94 (1982). Yet others, often
relying upon Fairman, have followed him in "running" the caution light. See, e.g., Bret
Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 1017
n.599 (1998).
"I One difficulty in writing an article like this is living up to one's own standards. As
Abigail Adams said to Royall Tyler, "Who of us my dear Sir practise [sic] as well as we
know?" PHYLLIS LEE LEVIN, ABIGAIL ADAMS 163 (1987). Have I been respectful, for
[Vol. 8:2
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Thus, Fairman committed the "sin" of disrespecting a significant figure in legal
history-John A. Bingham. Fairman's failing was not in disagreeing with Bingham.
Disagreement and even negative assessment is every scholar's right and sometime his
or her duty. However, Fairman failed to take Bingham seriously. This was a "sin"
against scholarship because it meant that Fairman did not maximize his insight into
the era and did not optimize the facts available in reaching his best judgment.
Like Charles Fairman, Professor Amar has many disagreements with the views
of John Bingham. Bingham's February 28, 1866 speech, a portion of which is
reprinted in the inside of the back cover of The Bill of Rights, was subtitled, "In
support of the proposed amendment to enforce the bill of rights." ' The speech was
not subtitled, as one might expect if Professor Amar's refined incorporation had been
contemplated, "In support of the proposed amendment to enforce some portions of
some ofthe bill of rights." Indeed, in that specific speech, Bingham indicated that the
effect of adopting the amendment would be to overrule Livingston v. Moore,49 which
held that the Seventh Amendmentjury trial provisions were not enforceable against
the states." This statement directly contradicts Professor Amar's refined
incorporation theory that justifies the non-enforcement of the Seventh Amendment
against the states." Moreover, Bingham's 1871 speech, in which he defined the
privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment as being comprised "chiefly"
example, of Charles Fairman? My writings make clear that I think Fairman took
generations of scholars on a wrong turn with respect to Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Aynes, Misreading Bingham, supra note 40, at 103-04; see also AMAR
supra note 1, at 188. I also think, however, that we all stand upon his shoulders and owe
him a tremendous scholarly debt.
Having read through much of Fairman's correspondence with Felix Frankfurter, one
is convinced that Fairman, to borrow Akhil Amar's play on words, was trying to be a "fair-
man." I think Fairman was diligent in his scholarship and as thorough as he thought he
needed to be. As I have tried to make clear in my biographical sketch of Fairman for Oxford
University Press' American National Biography, I do not think Fairman was deliberately
un-even-handed. See Aynes, Charles Fairman, supra note 18.
A colleague, noting how I have used Charles Fairman as a point of departure in much
of my research, has jokingly suggested that if Charles Fairman did not exist, I would have
to invent him. Yet, in a real sense, Charles Fairman challenges me in the same way that I
think John Bingham should have challenged Charles Fairman. I must puzzle through the
problem of how someone of Fairman's background and ability could reach the conclusions
he did. I must continue to put myself in Fairman's shoes to make sure where the legitimate
disagreements lie and where I am not working hard enough to understand how and why
Fairman reached different conclusions than mine.
4s CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866).
49 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833).
SO See id. at 551-52; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (1866).
m See AMAR, supra note 1, at 276.
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of the first eight amendments, which he quoted verbatim, 2 would seem to contradict
Professor Amar's entire theory of refined incorporation.
Yet, in contrast to Fairman, Professor Amar makes sense ofBingham's analysis,
even when it directly contradicts Amar's own conclusions. He takes Bingham
seriously and reads his speeches empathetically. There are over twenty references to
Bingham in the index to The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction." When
a section of Professor Amar's book was excerpted in TheAmerican Lawyer, a picture
of Bingham was printed in the center of the first page. 4 The article's title was Hero
Worship and The Bill of Rights, with a subtitle Let us now praise John Bingham."
Even though Professor Amar's selective incorporation is directly at odds with the
literal readings of several of Bingham's speeches, he treats Bingham's views with
respect.5 6
There are other examples of Professor Amar's respect for those with whom he
disagrees. The early portions of his section on reconstruction treat antebellum ideas
respectfully, especially those on the enforceability of the Bill of Rights and John
Marshall's decision in Barron v. Baltimore"' and its progeny. Barron was one of
the bases of a prior major scholarly conflict between William W. Crosskey of
Chicago and Charles Fairman, then at Stanford. Fairman's research concluded that
Chief Justice Marshall had been correct in Barron and rejected both Crosskey's
analysis and that of the people to whom Amar refers as the Barron Contrarians,
people who interpreted some or all of the Bill of Rights to apply to the state both
before and after Barron.6 ° Fairman was "unforgiving in his insistence that Barron
52 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871).
3 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 398.
4 See Amar, Hero Worship, supra note 3, at 66.
55 Id.
56 One might suggest that the comparison between Amar and Fairman is not an apt one.
After all, Fairman read Bingham's speeches and was confused. Amar read the speeches in
a way that made sense to Amar and in a way that supported his general reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment. There are two points to be made here. First, it is entirely possible
that had Fairman read with empathy and in context, he too would have "made sense" of
Bingham's views-whether he agreed with them or not. Second, though the principle of
empathetical reading undoubtedly applies to everyone, the danger is the greatest when we
are dismissive of historical actors whose views are incongruent with our own.
17 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
5 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 137-62.
9 Compare Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations
on State Governmental Authority, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 40 (1953) [hereinafter Fairman,
Supreme Court] (arguing that Barron v. Baltimore was properly decided) with W.W.
Crosskey, Charles Fairman, 'Legislative History,' and the Constitutional Limitations on
State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954) (arguing that Barron v. Baltimore was
erroneously decided). This debate is treated in Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note
6, at 1243-56.
6 See Fairman, Supreme Court, supra note 59, at 44-78 (arguing the correctness of
416 [Vol. 8:2
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was not only the correct decision, but also the only rational possibility.' Indeed,
Pamela Brandwein suggests that, given his approach, "Fairman was ill-equipped to
even imagine that the legitimacy of Barron might be challenged. 62 Similarly, in
articulating a distinction between "law" and "true law," Brandwein concludes that
Fairman "was conceptually ill equipped to even imagine that Bingham and the
Republicans could hold such a distinction, much less act on it.",63 In contrast,
Crosskey championed the Contrarians as the true interpreters of the Constitution and
rejected Barron and the mainstream legal arguments about its correctness.64
Professor Amar follows the path of neither Fairman nor Crosskey. Like
Crosskey, on the Fourteenth Amendment Framers, Amar reads and researches
empathetically. 6 For example, Professor Amar begins this section of his book with
the following: "Having worked hard to understand Barron, we now must work
equally hard to understand the contrary view .... , 66 He tried to put himself in the
shoes of the Contarians to understand, if not to agree. One is reminded of Walt
Whitman's account of empathy: "Agonies are one of my changes of garments. I do
not ask the wounded person how he feels, I myself become the wounded
person .... , 67 Unlike Fairman, Professor Amar does not denigrate these people by
treating their ideas as unworthy of serious consideration. By treating the Contrarians
with respect, by taking them seriously as people and as thinkers, Professor Amar
develops a cogent explanation of their views and how they could reasonably have held
those views.68 Yet, unlike Crosskey, Professor Amar's empathy does not lead to
endorsement. For all of his empathy, Professor Amar reaches the same conclusion
as Fairman-supporting Barron as the correct decision.69
One of the reasons Amar's book has been initially well-received is that he has not
committed the "sin" of disrespect. He researches and writes empathetically. He tries
to understand even if-and maybe especially if-he does not agree. As Steven
Calabresi notes, "Professor Amar's ability to put himself in the shoes of members of
Barron); see also AMAR, supra note 1, at 145 (outlining the arguments that the Bill of
Rights applied to the states).
6 Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1246; see also Brandwein, supra note
29, at 305 ("Fairman was locked into his view of Barron as the only authoritative source
of the meaning of the antebellum Constitution .....
62 Brandwein, supra note 29, at 305.
63 Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
6 See Crosskey, supra note 59, at 119-43. The reasons why two such intelligent scholars
could reach such opposite conclusions while looking at largely the same data will be
discussed. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
65 See generally AMAR, supra note 1, at 145-62.
66 Id. at 145.
67 WHITMAN'S 'SONG OF MYSELF'-ORIGIN, GROWTH, MEANING 61 (James E. Miller,
Jr. ed., 1964).
61 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 145-56.
69 See id. at 144-45.
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a particular generation of lawyers and to read texts as they would have read them...
is quite extraordinary."' He has practiced the virtue of taking people seriously.
1H. METHODS OF INTERPRETATION
As one reads the Fairman/Crosskey debates on the application of the Bill of
Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, it appears that Crosskey
came closer to the truth. One must-question how two leading scholars came to such
opposite conclusions.
The "rule" about reading empathetically and taking people seriously, applies
when reading both Fairman and Crosskey.7" The answer is that Crosskey-and not
Fairman-worked within the accepted canons ofconstruction. When it came time to
look to the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, Crosskey utilized conventional
sources for determining the meaning of the Amendment and Fairman eschewed those
conventional sources."
For example, like Amar, Crosskey utilized a highly empathetic reading of the
Reconstruction debates." Whatever one concludes concerning the merits of his work
on these issues, Crosskey was working well within the conventions of legal
scholarship. He examined the language used in the drafting of the various proposed
amendments and the legislative history as contained in the Congressional Globe.
74
He relied largely upon the key speeches of the drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment
in the House, John Bingham, and the floor manager in the Senate, Jacob Howard. 7,
Crosskey was able to parse the text of the Amendment and its legislative history in
a way that presented a coherent reading of the Framers' intent and the plain meaning
of the text. His focus was primarily upon the pre-ratification debates.76
70 Calabresi, supra note 5, at 2279.
" Early in my own work on the Fourteenth Amendment, I knew that Crosskey was a
largely discredited scholar. In early discussions of their critique of an article published in
1993, Michael Kent Curtis and Akhil Amar convinced me that, even if I supported my
views independently, I needed to take Crosskey seriously. Further, I would suggest that in
spite of the spirited responses Raoul Berger has made to Michael Kent Curtis's work,
Professor Curtis has set a good example for all of us in continuing to respect and take
seriously the views of Raoul Berger.
72 See Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1244-50.
7 See Crosskey, supra note 59, at 10-100.
7 See id.
" See id.
76 Normally, we might think that the views of the ratifiers would have more effect than
those of the Framers. However, when we think about the original Constitution, we often
consult Framers' views. This is so for three key reasons. First, they are the ones whose
views are preserved in a coherent form (e.g., the Convention debates and the Federalist
Papers). Second, for a Constitution that was ultimately ratified by 13 different states, the
attempt to discern a "consensus" among so many actors is a daunting, and at times,
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Fairman took a very different approach. In Fairman's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, he rejected the conventional sources of determining the
meaning of the Amendment-statements by the legislative leaders and the plain
reading of the text." Indeed, because of his inability to read the debates
empathetically, Fairman could not make sense of Fourteenth Amendment author John
Bingham's fairly straightforward statements.7" Faced with legislative debates that left
him in confusion, Fairman resorted to post-ratification actions of the states to try to
explain the meaning of the text.79 Ultimately, both Crosskey and Fairman were good
scholars with powerful insights.' However, those insights triumphed only when they
worked within the normal conventions of scholarship.
One of the reasons that Amar's The Bill of Rights has enjoyed such a strong
initial reception is that, like Crosskey reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, Amar
works within the conventions of scholarly interpretation. Indeed, as Professor
Lockland Bloom writes, Professor Amar "capably employs virtually all accepted
forms of constitutional analysis."'"
impossible task. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1996). Finally, in a document with many dissimilar
proposals that had to be voted up or down as a whole, there were no doubt shifting
coalitions that might have voted for ratification even though they were adamantly opposed
to some provisions.
These factors all apply to the multifaceted five sections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As David Kyvig notes:
To combine a number of proposals into a single measure subtly but perceptibly
shifted critical decision making from the ratifiers to the initial adopters of an
amendment resolution. Unlike the 1790s experience [when the Bill of Rights was
proposed], states would confront a take-it-or-leave-it, all-or-nothing choice.
DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT & AUTHENTIC ACTS, AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
1776-1995, at 166-67 (1996). As I have tried to develop elsewhere, the Fourteenth
Amendment deliberately contained multiple provisions so that the voters would not have
had a choice. They would have had to accept the portions they detested in order to obtain
the benefits of the portions they thought necessary for the survival of the country. See
Richard L. Aynes, The Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment, in THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (David E. Kyvig ed.,
forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Aynes, Unintended Consequences].
" See Fairman, Supreme Court, supra note 59, at 40-44.
78 See Aynes, Misreading Bingham, supra note 40, at 66-74.
79 See id at 96-103.
80 One other difference between the approaches of Crosskey and Fairman is their
treatment of judicial precedent. Fairman had a greater interest in the precedents established
by the Court, while Crosskey had a greater respect for the text and legislative history. See
Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1244; Brandwein, supra note 29, at 312.
"' Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Long Live the Bill of Rights! Long Live Akhil Reed Amar's
The Bill of Rights!, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 313, 315 (1999) (emphasis added). Professor
Bloom also points out that Professor Amar's creativity is in building upon and enriching
"the conventional devices of constitutional analysis." Id. at 317. I do not mean to suggest
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III. GOOD JUDGMENT ABOUT CONTEXT
Professor Amar's special gift is to see interrelationships between various parts
of the Constitution and, even more so, between the text and matters outside of the it. 2
To return to Charles Fairman, his failure to make sense from the debates of the
thirty-ninth Congress may have been due, in large part, to the fact that he began with
the debates of the thirty-ninth Congress. 3 For example, in his classic and still
frequently cited 1949 article on incorporation, not one of Fairman's 392 footnotes
makes reference to any Congressional speech prior to the thirty-ninth Congress. 4
Yet, by all modem accounts, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment came about
as part of the process of the battle against slave power, much of which was played
out in earlier Congresses.8 One may well have difficulty understanding the nature
of the debates ofthe thirty-ninth Congress without some references to the history that
led to those debates.
Similarly, Fairman was educated under the reactionary Dunning School of
history. 6 It appears that Fairman did not seek out historical sources available to him
that would have presented a more balanced view of Reconstruction. 7 Moreover, he
had simply not utilized the new information and new insights produced by a new
generation of scholars when preparing his later works. 8
These failures of context-the failure to understand the history underlying a
certain period of time and the failure to place one's own work in the context of
contemporary scholars-may well limit the enduring nature of Fairman's work.
Happily, we see no such limitations in the work of Professor Amar. Amar has
properly identified the context for his refined incorporation theory by beginning with
that we cannot develop new and better methods of problem solving. Yet, we do so at our
peril, unless we build a firm foundation for such methods that will gain them widespread
acceptance.
82 See AMAR, supra note 1, at xi-xv.
83 See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 6.
8 See generally id.
85 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877 (1988); Aynes, Refined Incorporation, supra note 7, at 290-97; Paul Finkelman,
Affirmative Action for the Master Class, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423 (1999) (describing the
ways in which the Constitution favored slaveholders). In contrast to Fairman, William W.
Crosskey constructed "a narrative with wider boundaries" because he saw the link between
the anti-slavery movement and the Republican Congressmen who proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brandwein, supra note 29, at 312.
86 See Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1204.
67 See id. at 1204 n.43.
88 See id. at 1269 n.489; see also Randall Kennedy, Reconstruction and the Politics of
Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521, 522 n.8 (1989) (indicating that Fairman had ignored "much
of the best work done in Reconstruction studies over the past twenty years").
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the initial drafts of the Bill of Rights.89 Indeed, it is the interaction between text and
context that may be the strongest aspect of The Bill of Rights.
IV. ANACHRONISTIC ANALYSIS
Another strength of Professor Amar's book is that he does not confuse his own
views with those of his historical subjects. He can provide empathetic readings of the
Barron Contrarians, without adopting their point of view." He works hard to avoid
anachronism and, according to Robert Spoo, considers anachronistic arguments "one
of the gravest criticisms" one can level at a scholar.9 In contrast, both Charles
Fairman and Felix Frankfurter transposed their own values with those of the
Fourteenth Amendment framers or ratifiers.'
For example, Professor Amar provides a fresh look at how important the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial was to those who adopted the Bill of Rights. 3 He does
so, in spite of the fact that he does not deem the Seventh Amendment to be
enforceable against the states.94
Similarly, the American grand jury can trace its ancestors back to the tenth
century and its protective "modem" function to 1681.9" The grand jury was seen by
the Revolutionary Framers as a necessary ingredient in the exercise of republican
rights96 and was seen as being so important as to require specific protection in the
Fifth Amendment.97 Professor Amar is attuned to these views in his own discussions
'9 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 3. Other issues of context have been raised with respect
to The Bill of Rights. Mark Graber has suggested that Professor Amar has not plumbed the
depths of political science in fashioning his view of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.
See Mark A. Graber, The Constitution as a Whole: A Partial Political Science Perspective,
33 U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 343 (1999). But see Akhil Amar, Continuing the Conversation,
33 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 583-85 (1999) [hereinafter Amar, Continuing]. Wythe Holt argues
that Professor Amar has paid too much attention to the legal elite and insufficient attention
to workers. See Wythe Holt, We Some of the People: Akhil Amar and the Original Intent
of the Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 377, 378 (1999). But see Amar, Continuing,
supra, at 593-95. Jack Rakove suggests that Amar's work does not quite measure up to the
norms of historians. See Rakove, supra note 5, at 195.
o See AMAR, supra note 1, at 145-62.
9' Robert Spoo, "No Word is an Island:" Textualism and Aesthetics in Akhil Reed
Amar's The Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 537, 566 (1999); see also Calabresi, supra
note 5, at 2282 (referring to Professor Amar's "almost archaeological excavation and
restoration of the Bill of Rights").
' See Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1217-24.
93 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 83-86.
94 See id. at92.
9' See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 344
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
96 See id
97 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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of the grand jury." Whether the grand jury was entitled to enjoy that degree of
respect in 1866-1868 is open to debate.99 It is clear that at least some states had
begun to experiment with forms of prosecution without the "protection" of grand
juries by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption."° However, the vast
majority of states at that time continued to require grand juries in criminal matters
involving felonies.'' There is also nothing in the debates of the thirty-ninth Congress
to suggest that it lacked respect for the grand jury.
From a policy standpoint, reasonable people can disagree as to the efficacy of
grand juries. However, it is very different to argue that it is not a good idea to require
grand juries than it is to say that the Fourteenth Amendment Framers did not think
it was a good idea to require grand juries.
Professor Fairman and Justice Frankfurter could not reach the conclusion that the
Framers did not value the grand jury based upon the text of the Amendment or
anything found in the legislative history. 2 Yet, they each began with great disdain
for the Seventh Amendment and grand jury provisions.0 3 When they considered the
question of whether the Framers could have intended to apply these antiquated
provisions to the states, they could only command disbelief. Their anachronism in
reading their own current beliefs back into history was their failing.'0 4
Separating one's views from historical views will not inevitably lead one to
conclude that thejury provisions of the Fifth and Seventh Amendments should apply
against the states. Indeed, while Professor Amar finds it "hard tojustify" the failure
to enforce the grand jury requirement against the states,'0 5 he seems to accept the
98 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 84-87.
" Many contemporaries see the grand jury as an arm of the prosecutor, giving little, if
any, protection to the accused. See Ovid C. Lewis, The Grand Jury: A Critical Evaluation,
13 AKRON L. REV. 33, 40 (1979).
'o See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 98-100.
'o' See id.
'02 See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 83; see also Aynes, Fairman
& Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1222-23.
103 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 200 (referring to "Fairman's anarchronistic hostility to
grand juries"); Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 1221-35.
"o What Professor Brandwein writes of Fairman's views on Barron seem equally
applicable here: "Fairman projected contemporary orthodoxy backward. In other words,
he universalized his present. He dehistoricized current orthodoxy, treating it as a 'natural'
object." Brandwein, supra note 29, at 306. Professor Fairman and Justice Frankfurter also
failed to place the choice in context. They considered the question of whether grand jury
provisions were describable in isolation. In doing so, they failed to consider whether the
benefits from oneor more of the sections of the Amendment would outweigh their view of
the "detriment" of the grand jury requirements. See generally Aynes, Unintended
Consequences, supra note 76 (discussing the choices faced by the Fourteenth Amendment
ratifiers and why provisions in Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Amendment would outweigh any
desire to avoid grand jury requirements).
o5 AMAR, supra note 1, at 307.
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conclusion not to apply the civil jury requirement to the states.'" In doing so,
however, Professor Amar avoids the sin of anachronism.
V. QUOTATION
Scholars writing legal history frequently quote other sources. Sometimes
quotation is a method of citing others as authority. Sometimes quotation is an effort
to give attribution to an apt expression that the author is unlikely to be able to match
independently. Sometimes a quotation is used as a form ofpersuasion. We all quote
and the current genre of legal scholarship requires one to quote frequently.'0 7
Yet, there are perils coupled with all of the positive benefits of quotation. One
may find one or even two sources for almost any proposition, no matter how absurd.
For example, during the thirty-ninth Congress, one congressman juxtaposed two
Biblical quotations thatjointly read: "Judas went out and hanged himself. Go and do
thou likewise."'0 8 Empathetic reading and context should help prevent such misuse
of quotations. Judgment and a commitment to a search for truth helps as well.
Equally as important, when we rely upon the conclusions of others, as we
necessarily must, we run the risk of being led astray. Consider, for example, a recent
article that cites Charles Fairman as authority and paraphrases Fairman's work. It
concludes, "As several of his colleagues' remarks suggested, Bingham was esteemed
more for his rhetorical exuberance than for his analytical perspicacity.""' This
quotation accurately reflects Fairman's conclusions." ° Yet, upon what are those
conclusions based?
Twenty-two years after Fairman's first encounter with Bingham, Fairman
continued to ignore many of Bingham's accomplishments that could imply legal
ability. Instead, Fairman concluded that Bingham had a "peculiar mode of
thought."' Fairman called on the recollection offour of Bingham's contemporaries
to "establish his standing."" 12 The four were former Republican Representative, and
later U.S. Senator, James Blaine; former Republican Representative, U.S. Senator,
and Secretary of the Treasury John Sherman; former Republican Representative, U.S.
'06 See id. at 276-307.
107 See any random page of this Article or any other article in this volume.
'0' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1054 (1866) (statement of Rep. Robert S. Hale)
(quoting Matthew 27:5 & Luke 10:37, respectfully).
'09 Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
909, 1017 n.599, citing 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at
1270. This is similar to Justice Frankfurter, who indicated that "the relevant historical
materials" had been canvassed "by legal scholars" and then cited only Charles Fairman's
1949 article. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 & n.3 (1959).
"o See 7 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supranote 40, at.133.
"'1 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 1270.
112 yj
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Senator, and Secretary of the Treasury George S. Boutwell; and Democratic
Congressman from Ohio and New York Samuel S. Cox." 3
Fairman interpreted the statements quoted from Blaine, Sherman, and Cox
praising Bingham's speaking ability, but implied one could be a good speaker without
being good at analysis." 4 Yet Albert G. Riddle, drawing on his experience in
Congress between 1861 and 1863, indicated that the Congress was "not a great
admirer of eloquence" and that "the mere maker of speeches [was] the most useless
of men.""'5
Sherman's statement was more oblique. When he praised Bingham for his
eloquence, it appeared to be a compliment. While he deprecated episodes of "flights
of oratory," he also indicated that Bingham "took a leading part in all the debates of
Congress.,' 6 It is unlikely that the dominant party in Congress would have allowed
a "confused" and "illogical person" to take a leading part in "all" of the important
debates.
The third Republican upon whom Fairman relied was George Boutwell." 7 It is
at least open to question whether Boutwell's statement concerning Bingham was
really negative at all. After attributing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to Bingham, Boutwell said the Clause's "euphony and
indefiniteness of meaning were a charm" to Bingham."' Given Fairman's New Deal
philosophy, the specter of an "indefinite" clause giving rise to Lochner"9 would
certainly have been anathema to Fairman. Yet, a logical person with values different
from Fairman might well want the clause written in a general way, in much the same
way that many parts of the original Constitution used general terms. 0 Whatever the
113 See id.
14 The Blaine quotation spoke of Bingham's "eloquence." The Sherman quotation
indicated that, next to Ohio Congressman and Senator Thomas Corwin (1794-1865),
Bingham was "the most eloquent" member of the Ohio delegation and "perhaps" one of the
top three orators in the entire House. Sherman also indicated that he thought Bingham was
engaged in too many "flights of oratory." The Cox quotation called Bingham "a man of rare
elocution" and quoted Cox, who supposedly quoted Thaddeus Stevens on a sarcastic remark
Stevens made about Bingham's oratory. Id.
..5 ALBERT G. RIDDLE, THE LIFE, CHARACTER AND PUBLIC SERVICE OF JAS. A.
GARFIELD 83 (Philadelphia, William Flint 1880).
116 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 1270.
117 See id
118 Id.
19 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45(1905) (holding that there were unenumerated
substantive due process rights inferred from the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically the
right to contract).
0 It is also possible that Boutwell's comments reflect confusion on his part. It is possible
that Boutwell wanted a more detailed and specific clause, while Bingham wanted a more
general clause. Neither circumstance would reflect poorly on Bingham's logic.
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accuracy of Boutwell's report, it implied nothing negative about Bingham's logical
ability.
IfBoutwell's comments were negative, then one would have to consider the fact
that he was a political enemy of Bingham.' By 1866, Bingham was the leader of
the moderate Republicans in the House. When the conservative Democrats were
willing to support the moderate Republicans, the moderates were able to defeat the
radicals led by Thaddeus Stevens.' One of Stevens' key supporters was George
Boutwell of Massachusetts.'
When the Johnson impeachment managers were elected, Bingham received more
votes than any member of the managers, including Thaddeus Stevens.'24 Thinking
that the managers had the right to select their own chairman, Stevens engineered the
Impeachment Committee's election of his protdg6, George Boutwell, as chairman. 23
Yet, Bingham insisted that he was entitled to be chairman because the House gave
him the largest number of votes. 2 6 In the end, Bingham was too important to the
impeachment effort for Stevens and Boutwell to allow him to leave the Committee.
They gave in, and Bingham chaired the managers.2 2 An angry Thaddeus Stevens
called Bingham names and said that Bingham "was Lord again."'
28
Life-long Democrat Samuel S. Cox was the only one of the four whose comments
directly supported Fairman's conclusion.'29 While Cox praised Bingham's
121 See 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 293.
22 Newspapers edited by one's allies or one's enemies need to be viewed with caution.
Recognizing that the Cadiz Republican had been an ally of Bingham, its 1878 retrospective
still bears investigation. Referring to events in 1868, the newspaper noted conflicts between
Stevens and Bingham. It claimed that Bingham "was the one man in Congress that old
Thad couldn't control." About Thad Stevens and John A. Bingham, THE CADIZ
REPUBLICAN, Apr. 11, 1878, at 2, col. 2. Further, it claimed that Bingham "was the leader
of the dominate party in Congress. Stevens was his rival... ." Id
123 See 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 293.
124 See 2 GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS
119(1902).
121 See id. at 119-20.
126 See id.
127 See id.
28 Id. This account is taken largely from Boutwell's memoirs. See id, The Stevens quote
is from About Thad Stevens and John A. Bingham, supra note 122, at 2, col. 2.
Fairman could have also mined Stevens' speech for negative comments concerning
Bingham. Stevens called Bingham "conceited, dogmatic, overbearing, exceedingly
offensive," a "mad bull," and an "arrogant fool." Id. Yet, except for possibly his use of the
term "fool," none of these are inconsistent with being logical. Given the struggle for
leadership between Stevens and Bingham, and Stevens' reputation for using "invective" to
try to keep straying Republican members in line, a careful scholar would use Stevens' words
with caution.
129 See supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text and infra notes 130-38 and
accompanying text; see also 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 37,
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"elocution," he claimed that Bingham lacked "reasoning faculty."' 3° Yet, Cox had
only harsh words for the Fourteenth Amendment itself:
This amendment introduced into the organic law a principle so abhorrent
to liberty and justice that from time immemorial it had been regarded by
the American people and their ancestors as one of the vilest which could
be resorted to, under the worst forms of tyranny. It was thought that no
free people could submit to it, under any circumstances. But there it
stands. It is to-day [sic] a monument to the satanic malice of the radical
party.1
31
Cox's views of the author of that Amendment cannot have been much higher.
Cox was also a harsh racist.'32 As late as 1888, Cox was still defending his own
conduct in opposing the war measures of the Lincoln Administration and voting
against the Thirteenth Amendment.133 While refusing in 1888 to defend slavery of the
1860s, Cox nevertheless referred to slavery as "harmless bondage two or three
hundred years ago."' 34 He argued that slavery should have been allowed to die a
natural death.13 Even in 1888, he did not believe the exclusion ofAfrican-Americans
as witnesses in cases involving only whites was "an oppressive regulation.' 36 Given
Cox's own moral and logical lapses, 37 he is notthe most credible source for the claim
that Bingham "lacked the reasoning faculty."'
3
at 1270-71.
30 SAMUEL S. COX, THREE DECADES OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION 585 (Providence, R.I.,
J.A. & R.A. Reld 1888).
'31 Id. at 257. It is unclear about which "principle" Cox was writing. The paragraph
immediately before the one quoted made specific references to Section 3 and then Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet, the remaining portion of the quoted paragraph praises
Democratic opposition to the Force Act, which was designed to enforce Section 1.
'32 See E. MARTIN, THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 197 (1984).
133 See COX, supra note 130, at 327.
134 Id. at 37.
'31 See id. at 220-2 1.
136 Id. at 388.
131 In order to avoid the "sin" of using an anachronism, this Article compares
Congressman Cox to the majority of people in his own generation, not to modem standards.
138 Cox, supra note 130, at 585. Fairman also relied upon "the discriminating article on
Bingham in the [Dictionary of American Biography]." 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 1271 n.213. Yet, that biographical sketch stated that
Bingham and his wife had three children. See I DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
278 (Allen Johnson ed., 1964). In fact, they had seven children. See ERVING E.
BEAUREGARD, BINGHAM OF THE HILLS, at xii-xiii (1989). It also claims that Bingham did
not introduce the antislavery resolution attributed to him at the 1848 Whig national
convention, see DICTIONARY, supra, at 278, when an examination of the very sources cited
in the biography indicate that Bingham did introduce that resolution. See Richard L. Aynes,
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From these four comments, Fairman constructed his dichotomy: Bingham was
a good speaker but not a sound thinker."9 It is ironic that Fairman, who eschewed
the use ofBingham's 1871 speech because it was three years after the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 40 would rely so heavily on recollections of Cox that
were written approximately fourteen years after Bingham and Cox served together
in Congress.' 4' Nevertheless, had he dug deeper, Fairman would have found that,
while not unanimous, many of Bingham's contemporaries thought well of his
analytical abilities and, contrary to Fairman's conclusion that Bingham was confused,
thought that he spoke With clarity.'42
An exhaustive account is not necessary here. Yet, this is what one finds if one
scratches the surface. Mrs. Laura Searing, writing in 1862 under the pseudonym
Glyndom Howard, indicated that Bingham was often spoken of as "the ablest man
of the House" of Representatives. 4 She also indicated that Bingham was such a
"clear and able [lawyer] that everybody approves thejudgment of Mr. Speaker Grow
in placing him at the head of the Judiciary Committee of the present Congress."'"4
In 1866, the New York Times counted Bingham "among the most learned and
talented" of the members of the House of Representatives. 45 In 1868, Bingham was
regarded as an able lawyer and especially."skilled in cross-examining witnesses."' 46
Former Congressman Albert G. Riddle called Bingham "one of our most effective
speakers," who the Republicans "usually put forward as [their] champion" in the
House of Representatives. '41
In 1869, Dr. John B. Ellis' The Sights andSecrets of the National Capital gave
descriptions of many members in Congress.)41 While Ellis condemned the whole
Congress, including Bingham, for excessive partisanship, there is no trace of doubt
John A. Bingham, in 2 AM. NAT'L BIOGRAPHY 792 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes
eds., 1999).
3 See 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 461-62, 1270,
1288; 7 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 40, at 133.
140 See 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 1270 & n.21 1.
'4' See COX, supra note 130 (published in 1888).
142 See infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
143 GLYNDOM HOWARD, NOTABLE MEN IN "THE HOUSE" 69-70 (New York, Baker &
Godwin 1862).
14 Id.
141 CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 41, at 120-21 (quoting N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1866, at 1).
'4 LINUS D. BROCKETT, MEN OF OUR DAY 467-68 (Philadelphia, Ziegler & McCurdy
1868).
147 ALBERT G. RIDDLE, RECOLLECTIONS OF WAR TIMES 115 (New York, G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1895).
14' See DR. JOHN B. ELLIS, THE SIGHTS AND SECRETS OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL 119-
79 (New York, U.S. Publ'g. Co. 1869).
2000]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
about Ellis' view of Bingham's reasoning ability; Ellis counted Bingham as "one of
the most learned men in the House" and termed him a "profound lawyer."' 49
* In July of 1871, Bingham took a trip across the country. Stopping in Portland,
Oregon, he gave a speech on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The local
newspaper characterized the speech as "an able and intellectual effort" that was
"received with great satisfaction by the audience."'' One member of the audience
was U.S. District Judge Matthew P. Deady, who described Bingham's address as
"logical, eloquent and grand."' 52
There are other indications that Bingham was well-regarded by his
contemporaries. At times, he was the Chairman ofthe House Judiciary Committee.5 3
He received the most votes of any member of the House to serve on the Board of
Managers to prosecute the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson.'54 Duringthe
term when Bingham was out of Congress, President Lincoln sought to give Bingham
responsible positions. The President tried to appoint Bingham to an important federal
judgeship in Florida, but he declined.' President Lincoln did appoint Bingham, with
his reluctant consent, to be a Major and Judge Advocate General, specifically for the
prosecution of the Surgeon General of the United States.'56 Lincoln later appointed
Bingham to be Solicitor of the Court of Claims."'
These appointments and selections do not compel the conclusion that Bingham
was the leading intellectual light of his age. However, the fact that the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and a President of the
United States who was known for his ability to judge people, would seek to appoint
Bingham to such responsible law-related positions would support a hypothesis that
Bingham was not the confused and befuddled person Fairman thought. Selection to
these responsible positions suggests a man of at least average legal ability.
149 Id. at 171.
ISo See id
'.' Our Visitors, THE PORTLAND OREGONIAN, July 19, 1871, at 3.
'52 THE DIARY OF JUDGE MATTHEW P. DEADY 28 (Malcolm Clark, Jr. ed., 1975) (entry
dated July 18, 1871).
' Bingham was Chair of the Judiciary Committee in 1860-6 1, see HOWARD, supra note
143, at 69-70, during the 41st Congress, see BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, 1774-1989, at 622 (U.S. Gov. Printing Office ed., 1989) (biographical
note), and again in 1872-73, see Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 858 (1873) (chronicling
Bingham's bill motions in Congress).
114 See Aynes, Impeachment and Removal, supra note 44, at 90.
1'5 See 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 363 (Roy Basler ed.,
1953); INSIDE LINCOLN'S CABINET: THE CIVIL WAR DIARIES OF SALMON P. CHASE 182
(David Donald ed., 1954).
356 See John A. Bingham, Judge Advocate, in LINCOLN TALKS 414 (Emanuel Hertz ed.,
Blue Ribbon Books 1941) (1939).
' See 8 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 155, at 242.
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This Article does not argue that we can, upon this information alone, resolve the
question of how Bingham's contemporaries perceived his abilities. A more thorough
search would undoubtedly produce more positive and negative statements. These
views would not resolve the question of Bingham's actual ability, but they would
provide the context for such an evaluation. My point is a different one: the fact that
we can string together a few quotations to make a plausible argument is not enough.
As scholars, we are duty bound to make informed inquiries before advancing a
judgment.
Professor Amar leads us on the path of virtue by avoiding random quotations.
In the section of his book that covers the area in which I have the most familiarity, the
Reconstruction Congress and the Fourteenth Amendment, his quotations are
accurately made and fairly support the points he makes."'
VI. THE VIRTUE OF SCHOLARLY CONSISTENCY
It is not consistency that is "the hobgoblin of little minds,"' " but foolish
consistency. In law, consistency is often part of what helps society aspire to be a
society of laws and not of men. A rational consistency is part of what allows us to
invoke concepts like equal protection of the laws. While eschewing a brittle, wooden
consistency, legal scholars must live by a "practice what you preach" consistency.
When one looks at the controversy over the meaning of the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, the consistent application ofthe same approaches to similar
situations helps us measure the efficacy ofa conclusion. With respect to the meaning
of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is an interesting speech by
Bingham, the Fourteenth Amendment's author, in the House of Representatives in
1871.6' In that speech, Bingham recounted the history of the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment and noted that the first eight amendments "chiefly defined"
the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
However, because the amendment was proposed in 1866 and ratified in 1868,
Charles Fairman objected to giving this after-the-fact account much credence.' 62
Thus far, no one has argued that Bingham's speech was a fabrication or that his
memory was inaccurate. 63 We are skeptical, however, of evidence of the legislator's
1s8 This Article does not mean to imply that a reasonable person might not reach a
different conclusion about any given quotation or its significance. It simply suggests that
Professor Amar's use of quotations is well within the conventions of our profession and
fairly supports his analysis.
'9 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 66
(Charles W. Eliot ed., reg. ed. 1937).
'60 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 81-86 (1871).
161 See id. at 84.
62 See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 135-36.
163 It has been suggested that Bingham's words in the 39th Congress were very consistent
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intent that arises after the fact, and Fairman and others have a right to raise the claim
of lateness with respect to this speech.'"
If we are to disregard Bingham's incontrovertibly clear post-ratification speech,
consistency would seem to demand that we also disregard other post-ratification
evidence. Fairman violates this plea for consistency in at least two ways. First, in
his Stanford article, Fairman relied upon the post-ratification writings of treatise
writer Thomas Cooley. 65 Though Fairman implies that Cooley addressed Fourteenth
Amendment issues in his 1868 treatise, it does not appear that Cooley treated the
Fourteenth Amendment at all. 66 For this same proposition, Fairman cited the 1871
and 1874 editions of Cooley's treatise. 67 The latter two volumes suggest that
Cooley's views were ambiguous in 1871 and, only in 1873, did Cooley clearly state
views consistent with Fairman's conclusion.6
Whether this reading is correct or not, the question of scholarly consistency
remains. If Cooley's view in 1871 did suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not make the Bill of Rights enforceable against the states, one questions why the 1871
views of a treatise writer would be relevant, while the 1871 views ofthe author of the
Amendment would be irrelevant. Scholarly consistency might allow us to consider
either both of the 1871 views or neither of the views, but it is not self-evident why
Cooley's supposed 1871 views should have weight over Bingham's 1871 views.
Similarly, just as Fairman sought to rely upon Cooley's post-ratification views,
many of the factors upon which he relied are post-ratification conduct by various
ratifying states. 169 Indeed, the primary difference between the Crosskey and Fairman
approaches lies in the fact that the former looked to the ratification period while the
latter focused upon post-ratification matters.'7 Yet, scholarly consistency should
treat post-ratification evidence the same, absent some special circumstance that merits
explanation.
Professor Amar has avoided the sin of inconsistency. He applies the same rules
of construction and evidence evenly to those with whom he ultimately both agrees and
disagrees.
with his 1871 statement. See Aynes, Misreading Bingham, supra note 40; Aynes, Refined
Incorporation, supra note 7, at 298-99.
'" See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 136.
161 See id at 116 n.306.
166 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (Da
Capo Press 1972) (1868).
67 See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 116 n.306.
168 See Aynes, Misreading Bingham, supra note 40, at 91-94.
169 See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 68-134.
170 Compare WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, 2 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1083-118
(1953) (focusing on possible reasons for the language of the Fourteenth Amendment) with
Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 134-39 (summarizing Fairman's
views).
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VII. NOT EVERY DISAGREEMENT IS AN IMPASSE
Disagreements are a common part of everyday life. Sometimes they are activated
by different points of view, by different goals, or by different desires. There are times
when there are no right or wrong answers. In constitutional debates, there are
certainly many times when there are no "correct" answers. 7 ' These are the cases in
which applying differing techniques of constitutional interpretation will produce
different results. Yet, we do well to recall that scholars enjoy this luxury that is not
always available to courts. In the words of Judge Jack G. Day, "It is an abuse of
discretion for a court to dispose of issues by concluding that they are too difficult to
resolve, then leaving the issues undecided."'7 One might also note that courts are
constrained to resolve even difficult issues in a relatively timely manner.
In a somewhat different context, Professor Amar made the same point: "Good
lawyers will often make opposing arguments using the same basic building
blocks-text, history, precedent, and so on-but in many cases, well-trained
interpreters will find, at the end of the day, that one side's arguments are better
arguments based on text, history, and so on.""' Not every disagreement is a
stalemate. If one driver insists on going through an intersection on a green light and
another insists on going through the same intersection on a red light, we know that in
the investigation after the crash the police officer will not say, "We have an
'7' One needs to be careful not to let the exception mislead us about the rule. For
example, one might think of the law that resolves disputes as a pyramid. At the lowest level
are common disputes that are resolved without any resort to law. They are resolved by
custom, negotiation, or by those with the most power, economic or other. At the next level,
tensions are resolved because everyone knows what the law is and obeys it. Next, we have
instances in which people seek lawyers, or some other third parties and negotiate a
settlement. We then move up to cases filed in courts, but ultimately compromised or settled.
It is only a few disputes that are actually resolved by judges or jurors. Of that number, an
even smaller number are appealed. Of the number appealed to intermediate state or federal
courts, only an infinitesimal number actually seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Last year, for example, a nation with a population of over 270 million people sought
review in the Supreme Court of only 8083 cases. See James Kilpatrick, Slow Days at the
Supreme Court, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, Sept. 6, 1999, at 6. This is less than one case
for every 33,333 people. Of those cases, only 75 resulted in a written opinion from the
Supreme Court. See id. This is less than six cases for every 3,600,000 people.
It is from this context that I have often advised my students to analogize the study of
Supreme Court cases with the study of "abnormal psychology." The Court only reviews
extraordinary and unusual cases. We should be cautious generating theories about the
psychology of normal people based upon studies of abnormal people. Similarly, we should
be cautious about generating theories of law for normal situations based on the difficult or
extraordinary cases.
172 Taylor v. Taylor, 440 N.E.2d 823, 823 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
'7' Akhil Amar, An(other) Afterword on The Bill of Rights, 87 GEO. L.J. 2347, 2355
(1999) (emphasis added).
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irreconcilable conflict between the 'green is go' theory and the 'red-is-go' theory.
Let's look for a new theory to resolve the conflict." No, the police officer will write
the ticket for the person advocating the red-is-go theory and move on to other work.
All too often in legal scholarship, we see the disagreement between scholars as
evidence of an "impasse" and call for a new theory which will hopefully produce
consensus. 74 At times, there are legitimate disagreements about the issues that
simply cannot be resolved with any sense of finality. On the other hand, there are
times when there are right and wrong answers. One recalls President Lincoln's
question about how many legs a sheep would have if one called its tail a leg. The




By the same token, calling a disagreement an impasse does not make it so.
There are strong disagreements over the question of whether the Bill of Rights
can be enforced against the states. 76 One reason for these disagreements is that
scholars have the usual disagreement about which method of interpretation can most
appropriately be applied to resolving the conflict.' Further, there are unusually
difficult problems with evidence for those who are concerned with original intent or
meaning. For example, Alfred Avins' very useful The ReconstructionAmendments'
Debates begins with the thirtieth Congress in 1849 and ends with the forty-third
174 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3-4 (1988)
(describing the nature of the "impasse" in Fourteenth Amendment scholarship).
This reaction may be the result of having served on many committees where consensus
is important. If two portions of a committee have differing views on the solution to a
problem, an easy solution would be to take a vote and let the majority prevail. This solution
frequently results in a discontented minority, a cost that is often too great to pay. As a
result, an alternative strategy develops, which finds common ground through a new and
different proposal. This approach is good for people who must work or live together;
however, it does not necessarily or invariably lead to good scholarship.
A contrary example is found in Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion in Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1535 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Citing the disparate
opinions of nine scholars in the area, Justice Thomas states, "Legal scholars agree on little
beyond the conclusion that the [Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities] Clause
does not mean what the Court said it meant in 1873." Id. at 1536 n.1 (citations omitted).
Though normally this might be the type of language a court would use to lay the
groundwork on an "impasse" argument, Justice Thomas proceeds to outline his view on
what history shows to be the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 1536-38.
' George R. Lamb, Words, in LINCOLN TALKS, supra note 156, at 328.
176 See NELSON, supra note 174, at 2-3; Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23,
at 5.
177 See NELSON, supra note 174, at 1-9.
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Congress in 1875.178 Even his excerpted version covers 743 pages of small print.'79
Beyond the Globe, we have the private papers of hundreds of Congressmen, records
(limited as many of them are) of state ratification legislatures, and the voluminous
newspaper accounts from every state then in the union.' As frustrating as it is that
some records were not created or no longer exist, the very existence of such large
amounts of primary materials make a comprehensive study of the Fourteenth
Amendment by any one person a daunting, and perhaps impossible, task.
Yet, it may be, like biography, that it takes many scholars working on the project
to make the "break through" that would allow a more general consensus to arise.
"No one would call this a team sport. However, it does sometimes seem to take all
the king's horses, and several biographers, to put a life back together again."'' The
divergent views expressed by Justice Black and ProfessorFairman did not produce
an impasse. 2 Instead, out of that dialectic came a better appreciation for the
Amendment than perhaps had ever existed since its ratification. Similar progress is
seen in contrasting the works of Raoul Berger'83 and Michael Kent Curtis.8 4 Others
bring their different perspectives adding special insights into these questions.'85
Whether we agree or disagree with their point of view, each new study adds to our
total knowledge of this voluminous material. With each new insight, we gain more
knowledge.
To his great credit, Professor Amar did not fall victim to the trap of the false
impasse. Rather, he took the current status of Fourteenth Amendment scholarship as
he found it, and added to our knowledge and insight.
"7 See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 1,743 (Alfred Avins ed., 2d ed.
1974). Among Avins' prolific writings is his own study of the incorporation debate. See
Alfred Avins, -Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates
Revisted, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968).
7. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES (Alfred Avins ed., 1967).
8' See, e.g., BOUTWELL, supra note 124 (detailing Fourteenth Amendment state
ratification legislature events); Cox, supra note 130 (same); Fairman, Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 23, at 81-132 (same).
1 Stacy Schiff, Perpendicular Lives, 68 AM. SCHOLAR 51, 59 (1999).
182 See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 23, at 5 (containing passage by
Justice Black).
183 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (2d ed. 1997) (asserting that the
Fourteenth Amendment had a-very limited intended scope of application).
184 See CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 41.
185 See, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997) (examining how the Amendment affected a variety of
"rights"); JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997) (canvassing the legislative and
public discussion in the South on the ratification of the Amendment); Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863 (1986) (discussing the views of U.S. Attorneys who
were initially charged with enforcing the Amendment).
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CONCLUSION
As much as I admire Professor Amar's work, it is too early to know whether The
Bill of Rights will become part of the canon of constitutional law.' Yet, its early
praise by many scholars with different views and different backgrounds is based, in
part, upon the fact that Professor Amar is a skilled writer and this is a well-written
book.8 7 Further, while Professor Amar has well-developed views and is prepared to
defend them, he truly means what he says when he states that he is writing to "start
a conversation, not end one."' 8
Beyond that, the initial positive reception The Bill ofRights has received is based
upon the fact that Professor Amar has avoided the seven deadly sins of legal
scholarship: he has taken people seriously; he has worked within conventional
methods of interpretation (even ifhe has developed an unconventional interpretation);
he has placed his research and conclusion in context; he has avoided anachronistic
analysis; he has quoted judiciously and fairly; he has weighed the importance of his
arguments; and he has avoided the false impasse.
In sum, whether we agree with his conclusions or not,8 9 Professor Amar has set
186 Professor Bloom has suggested that Amar's book "certainly has the potential to be
influential long into the future." Bloom, supra note 81, at 317; see also id. at 323 ("I do not
know whether it will become a part of the canon to a somewhat wider audience.").
... Mark A. Graber has suggested that The Bill of Rights "may be the most well-written
book on American constitutionalism published this decade." Graber, supra note 89, at 347
n. 14 (1999). Gary Lawson considers The Bill of Rights to be "one of the best law books of
the twentieth century." Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point, 33 U.
RICH. L. REV. 511, 511 (1999); see also Bloom, supra note 81, at 313 ("[Amar's] book
builds [up]on two of the most breathtaking and important law review articles of the past
decade" and "deserves to sit on every constitutional scholar and lawyer's shelf along
with... other contemporary classics.").
188 Amar, Continuing, supra note 89, at 579; see also id. at 600 ("My aim today is not
to end the conversation, but to continue it.").
89 1 have previously expressed my reservations about the doctrine of refined
incorporation. See Aynes, Refined Incorporation, supra note 7. In essence, my doubts are
the result of two factors. First, there is no expression of refined incorporation in the text or
the legislative history. To the contrary, the author, who was both the leading proponent in
the House and the floor manager in the Senate, gave public speeches widely reported in the
newspapers that can be fairly read to support full incorporation and to contradict refined
incorporation. See id. Second, refined incorporation seems to be based upon the assumption
that Article I, Section 9 is the source of the "right" to a writ of habeas corpus. In my view,
the right to habeas corpus predates the Constitution and was undoubtedly a privilege or
immunity of Article IV, Section 2 of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See C. Michael Walsh & Richard Aynes (forthcoming article on the right of
habeas corpus). If this is true, then Article I, Section 9 is not the source of a right to be
contrasted with the Capitation Clause in order to prove the point of refined incorporation,
but rather only a "structural" right dictating when the government can suspend the clause.
Because this is the lynchpin of the textual argument that The Bill of Rights puts forth for
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a high example for all of us to follow in avoiding the seven deadly sins of legal
scholarship and following the seven virtues.
refined incorporation, I doubt that the doctrine can be supported except as a matter of
policy.
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